The Reverse Auction: A New Approach to Experimental Auction Valuation by Corrigan, Jay R.








The Reverse Auction: 
A New Approach to Experimental Auction Valuation 
 
 
Jay R. Corrigan 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Economics 
Kenyon College 




Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics 
Association Annual Meeting, Long Beach, California, July 23-26, 2006 
 
 
Abstract: I propose an alternative approach to auction valuation in which participants 
indicate the quantity they wish to buy at a series of prices, with the understanding that 
one will be randomly chosen as the binding price. This technique allows researchers to 
estimate entire demand curves as well as own-price elasticities. (JEL: C91, C93, D44) 
 
 
Keywords: Experimental Auctions, Price Elasticity of Demand, Reverse Auction 
 
 
Copyright 2006 by Jay R. Corrigan. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim 
copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this 
copyright notice appears on all such copies. 1 
Introduction 
In the overwhelming majority of retail transactions taking place in the field, potential 
consumers are presented with a fixed price at which they can buy one or more units of the 
good for sale.  This is particularly true in the supermarket and restaurant environments 
where Americans buy most of their food.  By contrast, in experimental auctions aimed at 
estimating the value of new products or product traits participants are presented with a 
fixed quantity and are asked to name the highest price they would be willing to pay.  This 
runs counter to a well established strand of the environmental valuation literature 
showing that participants find naming their own price difficult (Freeman 2003).  The 
novelty of the name-your-price exercise is then further compounded by the introduction 
of an unfamiliar demand-revealing auction mechanism.   
In this paper I propose an alternative approach to laboratory and field auction 
valuation in which participants are instead asked to name the quantity they wish to buy at 
a series of different prices, with the understanding that one of these prices will be 
randomly chosen as the binding market price.  By separating what participants pay if they 
win the auction from the quantity they indicate, this “reverse auction” preserves the 
demand-revealing properties of other widely used auction mechanisms (e.g., Vickrey, 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak, random nth-price), but in a market environment far more 
familiar to participants.  I also report the results of a pilot study where I use this new 
approach to estimate the demand and own-price elasticity for fair trade chocolate bars.   
In addition to the greater familiarity of the name-your-quantity exercise, the 
reverse auction has a number of other benefits.  First, the reverse auction format allows 
the researcher to incorporate outside substitutes in an intuitive and non-arbitrary way.  2 
For example, suppose a researcher is interested in estimating the premium consumers are 
willing to pay for the organic designation as applied to farm-raised salmon.  In this 
situation, the outside substitute is clearly conventional farm-raised salmon, a product 
participants could purchase at a supermarket for $X per pound.  In a reverse auction, the 
researcher can easily sell the novel organic product alongside its conventional 
counterpart.  Specifically, participants would be offered an array of prices for the organic 
salmon (say, $V, $W, $X, $Y, and $Z) and would be told that the conventional salmon 
always sells for $X per pound.  For each of the five price combinations, participants 
would then indicate the quantity of each type of salmon they would like to buy with the 
understanding that only one of the price combinations would be randomly chosen as 
binding.  This incorporation of field substitutes addresses a longstanding criticism of 
experimental auction valuation (Harrison 1992).  Corrigan (2005) shows that WTP bids 
submitted in a laboratory auction setting are significantly influenced by participants’ 
beliefs regarding the relative difficulty of buying or selling the good outside of the 
experimental market, suggesting that laboratory auctions are not hermetically sealed 
markets and underscoring the importance of the incorporation of outside substitutes into 
experimental auction methodology.   
Second, because participants can request any non-negative quantity at a given 
price level, the reverse auction allows the researcher to estimate individual participants’ 
entire demand curves, not just their willingness to pay for a single unit.  While this is also 
possible using demand-revealing multiunit auctions such as the Groves-Clark auction 
mechanism (Clarke 1971, Groves 1973), List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) observe that 
such auctions are demand revealing “only in cases where every bidder’s demand curve is 3 
either flat or downward sloping” (p. 962).  This is not a concern with the reverse auction 
assuming that the experimenter has enough units of the good on hand to meet every 
participant’s demand.  This condition would be easiest to meet, of course, in auction 
experiments where just one individual participates at a time such as the “in-store 
valuation” auctions pioneered by Lusk et al. (2001). 
Third, aggregating individual demand curves across participants allows the 
researcher to meaningfully estimate market demand.  This is not possible using 
conventional auction methods where all we observe is participants’ willingness to pay for 
a single unit.  Using conventional auction methods, aggregation across participants would 
necessarily ignore the value participants place on subsequent units. 
Finally, and most importantly, the aggregated market demand curve allows the 
researcher to estimate own-price elasticity of demand, a core economic concept that has 
been virtually ignored in the experimental auction literature.  While Rousu, Beach, and 
Corrigan (2006) attempt to estimate inverse elasticities using data from a conventional 
name-your-price auction experiment, to my knowledge no experimental auction study has 
estimated own-price elasticity of demand. 
In the next section I will discuss the design of an experiment that uses the reverse 
auction to estimate demand curves for fair trade chocolate bars in a laboratory 
environment.  This is followed by a discussion of empirical estimates of own-price 
elasticity of demand.   
 4 
Experimental Design 
Four groups of fourteen or fifteen Principles of Economics students took part in this 
study, for a total of 58 participants.  The experimental auction had five steps: 
Step one.  Participants arrived and were assigned by a monitor to one of fifteen 
computer workstations in a computer classroom.  These workstations were situated so 
that it was not easy for one participant to see other participants’ computer screens. 
Step two.  A monitor provided participants with both web-based and oral 
instructions on the workings of the reverse auction mechanism.
1  This introduction 
included an example and a quiz on the auction format.     
Step three.  A monitor provided participants with detailed written and oral 
descriptions of both products up for auction.  Participants also received a small sample 
(~4 grams) of the fair trade chocolate in order to mitigate bidding behavior motivated 
primarily by “preference learning.”  Shogren, List, and Hayes (2000) show that between 
61% and 92% of willingness to pay to upgrade to a superior good can be attributed to 
preference learning, not consumption value.   
Step four.  In the real auction that followed, participants were presented with a 
menu of price combinations.  The price of the fair trade chocolate bar ranged from $0.50 
to $2.50 in twenty-cent increments.  A conventional chocolate bar of similar quality was 
always available for $1.50, roughly the same price at which it could be purchased outside 
of the experiment.
2  For each of these eleven price combinations, participants indicated 
                                                 
1 The web-based instructions and the auction used in this study can be viewed at 
http://www.openwater.ca/auction/. 
2 The auction instructions indicated that both chocolate bars were “of similar quality.”  In a small pilot 
study (N = 29), participants sampled both chocolate bars in a blind tasting without any indication that one 
bar was fair trade.  Participants then submitted WTP bids in a second-price auction.  Mean WTP for the two 
bars differed by just 2¢, not a statistically significant difference (p = 0.57 using a Wilcoxon sign-rank test 
and 0.85 using a paired t-test). 5 
the quantity of each type of chocolate bar they wished to purchase, understanding that 
one of the price combinations would later be randomly drawn to determine the binding 
price. 
Step five.  A monitor determined the binding price pair by drawing a number from 
a jar.  Participants were then dismissed one-by-one, at which point they were paid $10 for 
participating in the study and any transactions agreed to were carried out. 
I should note that this type of name-your-quantity exercise is not unprecedented in 
the economics literature.  Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) gave potential buyers 
bid forms with a series of prices and asked each participant to indicate “I will buy” or “I 
will not buy” at each potential price.  However, these authors’ design differed from the 
design I present here in two important ways.  First, participants were able to purchase at 
most one unit, which does not allow the researcher to meaningfully aggregate quantity 
demanded across participants (thus making it impossible to estimate elasticity).  Second, 
a group of potential sellers also completed a similar exercise, and the binding price was 
the price that cleared the market.  Because of this reliance on sellers as well as buyers, 
this design would not be useful for conducting field auctions with one participant at a 
time (Lusk et al. 2001). 
 
Empirical Results 
Table 1 reports the aggregated quantity demanded for each good at each price 
combination.  As expected, the quantity of fair trade chocolate bars demanded falls as the 
price of those bars increases.  Interestingly, while the quantity of conventional chocolate 
bars demanded is positively correlated with the price of fair trade chocolate bars for 6 
prices greater than or equal to the $1.50 outside price of those bars (p < 0.01), there is no 
significant correlation between the two for prices below the outside market price (p = 
0.08). 
While there are any number of demand specifications that would allow for the 
estimation of own-price elasticity for the fair trade chocolate, here I will consider the 
double-log specification and a simple flexible functional form.  Turning first to the 
double-log specification, I estimate the quantity of fair trade chocolate bars demanded 
aggregated across participants as a function of the price of fair trade chocolate using the 
following demand equation:  
(1)  01 ln ln FT FT QP β βε =+ + . 













Using ordinary least squares to estimate equation (1) yields  1 ˆ ˆ 2.33 ηβ == −  ( 0.01 p < ).  
The results of this regression are presented in table 2. 
  I also consider a simple flexible functional form.  A flexible functional form is 
one that can approximate a given twice-differentiable function to the second order at any 
arbitrary point.  The following quadratic specification is the most straightforward of these 







QP β ββ ε =+ + + . 
Under this specification, own-price elasticity of demand is a function of price and is 
estimated as 7 


















Using ordinary least squares to estimate equation (3) yields the results presented in table 
3.  Using equation (4) I can then estimate η about any  FT P .  For example, setting 
$1.50 FT P =  (i.e., the outside market price of the substitute conventional chocolate bar) 
ˆ 4.53 η =− .  Using a bootstrapping technique to generate a confidence interval around  ˆ η 
yields a 95% confidence interval of (-6.73, -3.34).  Specifically, I drew 10,000 
realizations of  0 β ,  1 β , and  2 β  from a multivariate normal distribution with a variance-
covariance matrix and mean vector taken from the OLS estimation whose results are 
presented in table 3.  For each of these draws, I calculated an estimate of  ˆ η .  The 
reported confidence interval was generated by ranking these 10,000  ˆ η  estimates and 
deleting the highest and lowest 250 (Krinsky and Robb, 1986). 
  Figure 1 depicts the estimated demand curves associated with the double-log and 
quadratic demand specifications.  While visual inspection suggests that both demand 
specifications seem to fit well, as a more formal test I have calculated 
2 R  for equation (1) 
and quasi 
2 R  for equation (3).  Quasi 
2 R  allows for fit comparisons of equations with 
different functional forms for the dependent variable.  Calculating quasi 
2 R  involves first 
transforming the predicted values of one of the dependent variables into the functional 
form of the other, then computing the necessary residuals using these new predicted 
values (Greene 2000).  In this case I have transformed the estimates of  FT Q  from 
equation (3) into estimates of ln FT Q , which can be directly compared with the results 
from regressing equation (1).  Quasi 
2 R  for the quadratic specification equals 0.703, 8 
while 
2 R  for the double-log specification equals 0.947, suggesting that the double-log 
specification offers better fit. 
 
Conclusions 
The reverse auction design presented in this paper represents a useful addition to the 
experimental auction practitioner’s toolkit.  While it is not meant to replace the name-
your-price auction mechanisms now ubiquitous in the literature, this name-your-quantity 
mechanism offers a useful complement.  In many cases, though, the reverse auction may 
be preferable to conventional auctions both because naming a quantity is a much more 
familiar exercise for participants, and because the reverse auction allows researchers to 
estimate the entire demand curves and, therefore, own-price elasticity of demand. 9 
References 
Becker, G., M. DeGroot, J. Marschak. 1964. “Measuring Utility By a Single-Response 
Sequential Method.” Behavioral Science 9:226-32. 
Clarke, E.H. 1971. “Multipart Pricing of Public Goods.” Public Choice 11:17-33. 
Corrigan, J. 2005. “Is the Experimental Auction a Dynamic Market?” Environmental and 
Resource Economics 31:35-45. 
Freeman, A.M. 2003. Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values: Theory and 
Methods (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future). 
Greene, W.H. 2000. Econometric Analysis (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall). 
Groves, T. 1973. “Incentives in Teams.” Econometrica 41:617-31. 
Kahneman, D., J.L. Knetsch, R.H. Thaler. 1990. “Experimental Tests of the Endowment 
Effect and the Coase Theorem.” Journal of Political Economy 98:1325-48. 
Krinsky, I., A.L. Robb. 1986. “On Approximating the Statistical Properties of 
Elasticities.” Review of Economics and Statistics 68:715-19. 
Harrison, G.W. 1992. “Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Reply.” 
American Economic Review 82:1426-43. 
List, J.A., D. Lucking-Reiley. 2000. “Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: 
Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment.” American Economic Review 90:961-
72. 
Lusk, J.L., J.A. Fox, T.C. Schroeder, J. Mintert, M. Koohmaraie. 2001. “In-Store 
Valuation of Steak Tenderness.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
83:539-50. 10 
Rousu, M.C., R.H. Beach, J.R. Corrigan. 2006. “Estimating Inverse Demand Elasticities 
Using Laboratory Auctions.” Working paper, Kenyon College. 
Shogren, J.F., J.A. List, D.J. Hayes. 2000. “Preference Learning in Consecutive 
Experimental Auctions.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82:1016-21. 
Shogren, J.F., M. Margolis, C. Koo, J.A. List. 2001. “A Random nth-Price Auction.” 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 46:409-21. 
Vickrey, W. 1961. “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders.” 
Journal of Finance 16:8-37. 
 11 
Table 1. Results of the reverse auction for fair trade and conventional chocolate bars. 
Fair trade chocolate  Conventional chocolate 
Price Quantity  demanded Price Quantity  demanded 
$0.50 168 $1.50  10 
$0.70 118 $1.50  8 
$0.90 83 $1.50  9 
$1.10 51 $1.50  8 
$1.30 35 $1.50  7 
$1.50 30 $1.50 11 
$1.70 17 $1.50 12 
$1.90 11 $1.50 17 
$2.10 8 $1.50  18 
$2.30 7 $1.50  18 
$2.50 4 $1.50  19 
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Table 2.  Regression results for the double-log demand specification 
Variable Coefficient  estimate 
Constant 3.95**  (0.10)
a 
ln FT P   -2.33** (0.17) 
2 R   0.947 
a Standard errors in parentheses. 




Table 3.  Regression results for the quadratic demand specification 
Variable Coefficient  estimate 
Constant 269.71**  (14.47)
a 
FT P   -255.62** (21.43) 
2 2 FT P   122.32** (14.04) 
2 R   0.976 
Quasi 
2 R   0.703 
a Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 1.  Estimated demand curves for the double-log and quadratic demand 
specifications 